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Populism	and	the	broken	engine	of	the	Italian
economy
In	Italy,	the	temptation	to	go	back	in	time,	or	shut	the	door	to	Europe	and	globalisation	is
strong,	especially	after	a	quarter	of	a	century	of	poor	economic	performance,	argue
Lorenzo	Codogno	and	Giampaolo	Galli.	Anti-establishment	parties,	which	gained	an
outright	majority	in	Parliament	in	the	country’s	recent	elections,	blame	the	past	reform
process,	together	with	the	threats	arising	from	globalisation,	European	integration	and
immigration,	instead	of	arguing	for	an	even	bolder	reform	agenda.
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Italy	is	an	anomalous	case.	It	posted	the	lowest	growth	rates	among	the	developed	countries	for	about	a	quarter	of	a
century.	This	anomaly	can	help	to	understand	why	the	anti-establishment	forces,	which	have	also	reaped	successes
almost	everywhere	in	the	Western	world,	gained	a	majority	in	the	latest	Italian	elections.	It	also	helps	to	understand
the	economic	policy	dilemma	facing	the	country	today.
Although	the	link	between	the	economic	crisis	and	the	success	of	anti-establishment	parties	is	not	mechanical,	it	is
evident	that	these	same	parties	have	denounced	the	many	aspects	of	deteriorated	social	conditions	and	that	this	has
been	the	key	to	their	success.
The	elections	produced	a		good	result	for	the	Five	Star	Movement,	a	populist	anti-establishment	party	that	did	not
exist	ten	years	ago	and	is	now	the	first	party	in	the	Italian	Parliament,	with	32.7%	of	the	popular	vote	and	35.2%	of
the	seats	in	the	Lower	House.	Another	party	scored	particularly	well,	the	League,	which	is	an	anti-immigrant	anti-
euro	far-right	grouping	that	used	to	be	in	favour	of	devolution	for	the	North	(Northern	League)	and	now	has	ambitions
for	the	whole	country.	It	got	17.4%	of	popular	votes	and	19.8%	of	the	seats	in	the	Lower	House.	Together	with	other
more	moderate	centre-right	parties,	it	now	commands	42.1%	of	the	seats.	The	incumbent,	the	Democratic	Party,
collapsed	to	18.7%	of	the	votes	and	now,	together	with	smaller	groupings,	controls	only	19.4%	of	the	seats	in	the
Lower	House.	Bottom	line:	it	is	a	stalemate.	Over	the	next	few	weeks,	the	President	of	the	Republic	will	try	to	broker
a	deal	to	form	a	new	government,	which	looks	a	very	challenging	endeavour,	to	say	the	least.
As	to	the	poor	economic	performance,	Italy’s	per	capita	GDP	stands	at	106	if	we	put	1995	equal	to	100,	which
means	that	Italy	has	barely	grown	over	almost	a	quarter	of	a	century.	All	the	other	OECD	countries	have	done	better,
including	the	wretched	Greece	that	stands	at	116.	The	Eurozone	without	Italy	stands	at	135,	which	corresponds	to
average	annual	growth	of	1.4%	over	1995-2017,	broadly	the	same	growth	recorded	in	the	United	States.	Among	the
other	major	countries,	Japan	was	second	only	to	Italy,	but	it	still	managed	to	be	at	119.
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Thanks	to	a	group	of	excellent	companies,	a	strong	export	sector,	and	the	policies	introduced	in	recent	years,	the
economy	started	to	grow	again	in	2014,	but	Italy	is	one	of	the	very	few	OECD	countries	that	have	not	yet	managed	to
recover	to	pre-crisis	levels.	To	date,	GDP	per	capita	has	contracted	by	8.2%	compared	to	2007.	Almost	all	other
countries	have	largely	exceeded	pre-crisis	levels.	The	Eurozone	net	of	Italy	stands	at	5.0	percentage	points	above
pre-crisis	levels,	the	United	States	at	6.4	points.	In	each	of	the	years	between	2015	and	2017,	Italy	recorded	GDP
growth	about	one	percentage	point	below	the	other	Eurozone	countries.	Moreover,	Italy’s	regional	divide	is	huge	and
has	not	narrowed	in	recent	years.
Most	economists	trace	back	such	a	poor	performance	to	Italy’s	difficulty	in	adapting	its	productive	structure	and
public	administration	to	the	challenges	of	globalisation,	technological	innovation	and	the	single	currency.	Indeed,	the
facts	do	not	support	the	idea	that	the	harsh	social	conditions	of	Italy	are	the	consequence	of	so-called	‘neo-liberal’
reforms	that	would	have	increased	inequalities	and	favoured	the	‘usual	suspects’.	Instead,	Italy	is	one	of	the	few
countries	in	which	the	Gini	inequality	index	has	remained	almost	unchanged	in	the	last	quarter	of	a	century.	Even
more	noteworthy	is	the	fact	that	the	share	of	labour	on	manufacturing	value	added,	diminished	in	many	countries,
has	increased	in	Italy	during	the	crisis,	and	has	returned	to	the	record	levels	of	the	early	seventies.
Here	we	come	to	the	dilemma,	which	risks	becoming	a	drama,	for	today’s	Italy.	According	to	the	majority	of
economists	and	international	organisations,	Italy	suffers	because	the	reforms	of	recent	years	have	not	been	enough
to	restart	the	broken	engine	of	the	economy.	This	is	because	they	have	not	managed	to	address	the	underlying
issues	forcefully	and	partly	because	of	insufficient	implementation	and	the	typically	delayed	impact	of	structural
reforms.	However,	the	perception	of	voters	―	especially	those	who	voted	for	anti-establishment	parties	―	is
precisely	the	opposite.	According	to	them,	the	missing	reforms	are	not	at	the	origin	of	the	troubles,	but	rather	those
already	introduced,	together	with	the	threats	arising	from	globalisation,	technological	innovation	and	immigration.	Not
surprisingly,	they	are	proposing	to	roll	back	the	recent	labour	market	and	pension	reforms.
Probably	the	lack	of	feel-good	factors	and	the	sense	of	insecurity	and	uncertainty	deserve	more	attention	and
different	answers	compared	to	the	past.	The	problem	is	that	Italy	is	in	the	middle	of	a	ford:	the	economic	and	social
costs	of	the	reforms	have,	by	and	large,	already	been	paid,	but	the	results	in	terms	of	income	growth,	employment
and	the	quality	of	work	are	still	lagging.	The	temptation	to	go	back,	or	shut	the	door	to	Europe	and	globalisation,	is
therefore	strong.	Nevertheless,	by	following	this	path,	the	economic	recovery	would	derail,	the	social	situation	would
get	worse,	and	the	state	of	the	public	finances	would	become	even	more	precarious.
There	are	mainstream	recipes	to	overcome	the	Italian	anomaly	and	more	innovative	solutions.	Even	some	new	ideas
by	the	populists	can	be	considered.	However,	these	new	political	forces	should	recognise	that	they	cannot	address
Italy’s	broken	engine	of	growth	by	rolling	back	reforms	or	worsening	the	already	fragile	state	of	the	public	finances.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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